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Introduction
Insurance policies are contracts
of adhesion with terms dictated en-
tirely by the insurance company. For
example, in auto insurance, the in-
sured has no negotiating power in
specifying terms of coverage. Ironi-
cally, the insured may find each in-
surer offering (dictating) essentially
the same basic poJicy provisions. This
is so because auto insurers subscribe
to a trade association, Insurance Ser-
vices Organization, Inc., which pro-
vides to the competing auto insurers
drafts of the policy language recom-
mended for use in their policies.
Nevertheless, the auto policy is a
contract, and the coufts sometimes
speak of it as the contract "between
the parties" or "to which the parties
agreed" as though the insureds had
any role or choice in negotiating the
terms.
Therefore, when disputes de-
velop about the validity of a clause,
the insurer benefits by arguing the
sanctity of contract especially if the
terms at issue are not ambiguous.
However, counsel for the insured or
the claimant tort victim cannot iust
genuflect at the aJtar of the rvritten
insutance contract just because the
clause at issue is in black ink on
white paper and unambþous at that.
As Professor Corbin said:
[]t may be pointed out that
"liberty of contract" as that
term is used by its admiret
includes two very different
elements. These are the privi-
lege of doing the acts consti-
tuting the ffansaction and the
power to make it tegally opera-
tive. One does not have "lib-
erty of coÍtttact" unless
orgarized society both for-
bears and enforces, forbears to
penalize him for making his
bargain and enforces it for him
after it is made.
This is the "liberty of contract"
that has so often been extolled as one
of the great boons of modern demo-
cnac civi\zatioh, as one of the prin-
cipal causes of prosperity and
comfort. ,{nd yet the very fact that a
chapter on "legality'' of contract
must be written shows that we have
never had and never shall have un-
limited liberty of contract, either in
its phase of societal forbearance or in
its phase of societal enforcement.
There are mâny contraci transactions
¡hat arc definitely forbidden by the
law, forbidden under pains and penal-
ties assessed for crime and tort; and
there arc many moïe such transac-
tions that are denied judicial enforce-
ment even though their makers are
not subject to affrmative pains and
penalties. ,{rthur L. Corbin, Corbin
on Contracts $ 1376.2
Consequently, an unambþous
clause with detrimental effect to the "
insured client or claimant must be
reviewed to determine whether it is
valid. The fact is, a black-and-white
contract clause may be invalid. Fitst,
it may directly violate a statute.
Montana's Insurance Code, Title 33,
Montana Code,A.nnotated, is a com-
pendium of rougtrly 600 pages of
statutory regulation of insurance and
insurance companies. An auto insur-
ance ptovision may violate a code
section of that title (or any other




provision providing for immediate
cancellation of the poJicy for nonpay-
ment of premium would violate
MCÂ S 33-23-212Q), which tequires
the carder to cancel only after 10
days' notice of cancellation.
Second, though an insurance
clause may not directly violate a stat-
ute, it may be found to be invalid for
violating public policy as expressed in
the state constitution or statutes. As
the court said in Youngblood u
Atnedcan States Ins. Co.r3 "The
only exception to enforcirìg an unam-
biguous contract term is if that term
violates public policy or is against
good morals."'
Third, a provision that doesnt
violate a code provision may be
found to be violative of "public
policy'' and thereby rendered invalid.
In Fïrst Bank (N.A.)-Billings u.
Ttansamedca Insutance Com-
pany,a the Montana Supreme Court
defined "public poJicy'? as "that prin-
ciple of law which holds that no
ciazen can lawfi-rlly do that which has
a tendency to be injurious to the
public or against public good."
Hence, an insurance provision "inju-
rious to the public or public good"
could be void as against public policy.
The court, in Fr¡s¿ Bank, set out the
sources of public policy for purposes
of determiningif an insurance prac-
tice or policy was in derogatitrn of
pubJic policy:
In determining the public
policy of this state, legislative
enactments must yield to con-
stitutional provisions, and judi-
cial decisions must recognize
and yield to constitutional pro-
visions and legislative enact-
ments.
Finaþ as insurance scholar
I(enneth S. Abraham says, there is "a
more diffuse but no less important
source of public policy; judicial sen.
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sitivity to the difference between
good and evil, fairness and unfair-
ness, straight dealing and over reach-
ing. Even when all other tests for the
validity of insurance policy provi-
sions have been exhausted, this re-
sidual category of restrictions on
what may and may not be included in
a policy remains."5 The Montana
Supreme Court in Fitst Bank
sttessed,'Judicial decisions are a
superior repository of statements
about pubJic policy only in the ab-
sence of constitutional and valid
legislative declarations." Nevertheless,
if the Montana Constitution and
legislative enactments reflect no par-
ticulat public poJicy in regard to an
insurance provision, the courts may
still test the provision against their
o.um statements of public policy. The
Montana Supreme Court has been
rìiligent in scrutinizing auto insurance
poJicy exclusions, offsets, conditions
and other clauses in the bright light
of its own statements of ('public
policy'' to determine whether the
provisions or clauses are valid.
Consequently, the lawyer faced
with an unambþous auto insurance
policy provision detrimental ro his
insured or clatntant must anaþe the
provision to determine if it is invalid
for violating:
1. a code provision in Title 33 or
Title 61 of the Montana Code
Annotated;
2. public policy as expressed in the
Montana Constitution;
3. public policy as expressed else-
where in the Montana Code
Annotated;
4. public poJicy as expressed by the
Montana Supreme Court; and
5. public policy on some previously
unrecognized argument that the
provision is injurious to society.
A.uto policies covering motor
vehicles operated in Montana com-
monly contain provisions deemed
jnvalid. While the Rates and Forms
Bureau of the Montana Insurance
Commissioner's Office reviews auto
poJicy forms and approves or disap-
proves their provisions for use in
Montana, the policies arc draftedby
the ISO and generally intended by the
insurer for use in many states in
which it operates. The Montana Rates
and Forms Bureau may not identifii a
particular ISO clause as having been
declared invalid by the Montana Su-
preme Court, or the carrier may sim-
ply continue using a form with the
invalid clause in it.
More importantly, given the reach
of interstate commerce and recre-
ation today, tens of thousands of
motor vehicles are operated in Mon-
Tana each year under out-of-state
insurance policies. In a line of cases,
the Montana Supreme Court has held
that out-of-state 
^rto poücies apply-ing to accidents that happen in Mon-
tana will be construed under
Montana law, fn Kemp u. Allstate,6
in 1979, the court determined that
the law of the place of performance
and not place of execution governed
the insurance policy contract. Âfter
considering the basic insuring agree-
ment, the territoridtty provision and
t-he "payment of loss" provision, the
court ruled that the place where the
judgment would be obtained v/as rhe
place of performance .In Youngblood
u. Amedcan States Ins. Co.r1 the
Oregon policy involved contained a
choice of law provision that speci-
fied the "place of performance" and
required application of Oregon law
However, the court voided the
policy's provision for subrogation for
Medical Payments, holding that it
was unenforceable as violative of
public policy by reason of the court's
holdingin Allstate Ins. Co. u
Reitle4s which doesn't allow subro-
gation for Medical Pay coverage in
Montana. In Swanson u llattford
Ins. Co. of the Midwestre the court
declared that application of a Colo-
rado choice of law provision violated
Montana's public policy that an ln-
suret could only subrogate when the
insured had been "made whole." In
2003, the court in Mitchell u State
Farm Ins. Co.rlo followed Kemp
holding that, even under the Restate-
ment of Law (Second), the contract
is governed by the law of the place
of performance which is the "place
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receive benefìts, has incurred accident
related expenses, or is entitled to
judgment."
Âs these cases illustrate, the auto
insurance policy involved will often
be an out-of-state poJicy that will
likely contain provisions violative of
Montana public policy but govefned
by Montana larv. Counsel has the task
of identifying the offending clauses
and persuading the insurer, or the
court if necessary, that the clause is
1) governed by Montana law and 2)
invalid and unenforceable insofar as
it violates Montana law or pubJic
policy.
SØhat follows here is a review of
particular insurance clauses that have
been ruled as invalid and unenforce-
able because they violate Montana
statutes or public policy as reflected
in the Montana Constitution, statutes,
or court decisions. \ü/here possible,
the authors will quote verbatim the
insurance clause from the policy
involved or will quote the standard
langoage from the ISO forms that
would be the likely equivalent to the
clause involved in the case. This
ardcle focuses on auto insurance
policies as opposed to other casualty
potcies, and the authors have
grouped the cases under the coverage
headings. Cases under Bodily Injury
Liability coverage generaþ will re-
flect issues of validity under the
Mandatory Liability Protection Act,
MCA S 61-6-301and the Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act,
MCA S 61.-6-103 et seq. Cases undet
Uninsured Mototist coveÍage gener-
ally involve issues of vaJidity as a
mattel of public policy parttculaily
in relation to the UM statute, MCA S
33-23-201,. The Underinsured Mo-
totist coverage clauses reflect deci-
sions based on judicially developed
public policy grounds particularþ the
reasonable expectations doctrine.
Finally, cases grouped under the
Medical Pay coverage clauses will
illusttate the recent battleground of
coverage issues.
Insurance Policy Clauses and Pro-
visions Held Invalid in Montana
Liability Coverage."Íhe "Ilouse-
hold Exclusion"
In Transameúca Ins. Co. u
Royúe,11 a 1983 case, the "household
exclusion clause" in Bodily Injury
coverage was declared void as against
pubJic policy. The policy excluded
liability coverage fot "bodily injury to
any person who is related by blood,
marriage, or adoption to [the in-
sured], if that person resides in [the
insured's] household at the time of
the loss." In Royle, a catastrophicaþ
injured chld sued her mother alleging
her mother negligently caused the
daughter's injuries while the daughter
was a passenger in her mother's auto.
Transamerica denied coverage by
reasorl of the exclusion. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court held the exclu-
sion violated public policy implicit in
Montana's Mandatory Liability Pro-
tection Act, MCA S 61-6-301 and the
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility
Act, MCA S 61-6-103 et seq. The
court reâsoned that $61-6-301 re-
quires minimum JiabiJity coverage to
cover "loss resulting from liability
imposed by law for injury suffered by
any person," and the act made no
exception for injury by family mem-
bers. The case was also based on a
recurring Montana judicial public
policy theme of failure to "honor the
reasonable expectations" of the in-
suted. Quoting Professor I(eeton, the
court stated the princþle as follows:
"The objectively teasonable expecta-
tions of applicants and intended
benefìciades regarding the terms of
insurance contracts will be honored
even though painstaking study of the
policy ptovisions would have negated
those expectations," The coutt said
the insured would reasonably expect
the liabiìity coverage to extend to
household members.
After Royle, insurers modifìed
the household exclusion into what is
known as the "step down" household
exclusion which, for family members,
blocks coverage fot amounts over the
minimum $25,000limit of liability. In
Shook u. State Fatm Mutual Ins.
Co.,12 State Farm's household exclu-
sion tead as follows:
When Coverage A Does Not
Apply: There is no coverage...
2. For Any Bodiþ Injør1 to: ... c.
an1 insøred ot aîy member of
an in¡ured's famtly residing in
the insured's household to the
extent the limits of liability of
this policy exceed the limits of
liability required by law."
Judge Hatfìeld held that exclu-
sion void by reason of ambiguity. He
reasoned that the exclusion defeats
the purpose of the Mandatory Liabil-
ity Protection statutes and is ambþ-
ous as it could be interpreted "as
intended to make clear the Jiability
provisions of the policy do not pro-
vide personal accident insurance to
any insured."
In companion cases in 1994, the
Montana Supreme Court invalidated
two "step down" household exclu-
sions and tefused to enforce them. In
Leibrund u. l{ational Fatmerc
[Jnion Prcp. and Cas. Co. and
Cole u Truck Insutance Ex-
changerl3 injured family plaintiffs
were precluded by step-down house-
hold exclusions from recovering
anything more than the minimum
limits of BI coverage required under
the Mandatory Liability Protection
Act. In LeÌbtand, the policy ex-
cluded "bodily injury to you or any
relative to the extent the limits of
liability of this poJicy exceed the
limits of liability required by law."
The renewal declarations page stated
that "fl]iability payments to house-
hold members are limited to the Fi-
nanciøJ. Responsibility timits of the
policy state." Similady, in Cole, an
exclusion in an endorsement to the
poücy precluded coverage "Arising
out of the liability of any insured for
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bodily injury to you or a family mem-
ber to the extent the limits of liability
of this poLicy exceed the limits of
liabiJity required by law" The declara-
tions page in Cole gave no notice of
the limitation of recovery by family
members.
The court found the policy provi-
sions in question in each case to be
"unclear and ambiguous" because
they didn't provide the consumer
untrained in the law any w^y to know
the limit of liabiJity when a family
member was the injured claimant.
The court declared the provisions
invalid and unenforceable. Most im-
portantly, the court prospectiveþ
warned of risk rhat any clarifìed
provision would still be deemed un-
conscionable because the poJicies
would be conffacts of adhesion that
"atbi:rrartly preclude full coverage for
farntly members, as opposed to all
other persons" iri a market in u¡hich
family members cannot obtain full
coverage, One can reasonably con-
clude that the step-down household
exclusion is invalid in Montana as
will be any such provision which is
clarifìed, since any such clarification
will likely violate publc poJicy for the
same reasons.
Note, however, that the court
enforced a household vehicle exclu-
sion in Amedcan Family Mutual
Ins. Co. u Livengood.la The exclu-
sion to the Bodily Injury coverage
provided:
This covetage does not apply
¡e' *** 9. Bodily Injury or prop-
erty damage arising out of the
use of a vehicle, other than
your insured car, which is
owned by or furnished or avail-
able for regular use by you or
any resident of your household.
Henninger and her roommate
were each insuted by American Fam-
ily. Henninger negligently injured
another while driving her roommate's
van. American defended and indem-
ni{ìed under the roommate's policy
but refused to indemniSr under
Henninger's liability policy because
of the above exclusion. Henninger
contended the provision, as in Royle,
violated the Mandatory Liabiliry Pro-
tection Act, but the court disagreed
sa)'lng that the exclusion met the
mandate of providing coverage for
"all persons." It simply didnt provide
additional Jiability coverage for other
vehicles.
Similarþ in Stutzman u Safeco
Ins. Co.rls the court upheld u ri-iiut
exclusion as applied to UIM coverage
on the ground that "there is no statu-
tory mandate for underinsured mo-
torist coverage in Montana." That
exclusion provided:
But undednsured motor ve-
hicle does not include any mo-
tor vehicle:.. 3) owned by or
furnished for the regular use
of the named insured ot afiy
relative.
Liability Coverage: "Without
Pe t mis sio nt' Excúus ion
In Allstate Ins. Co. u.
IIankinson 16 Hankinson, a juvenile,
negligently dtove someone else's auto
without their permission causing
injuries to a thfud party. His father's
insuret, Allstate, refused to defend or
indemnift because Allstate's coverage
of "non-owned" autos extended only
to 'A non-owned auto used by you or
a resident relative with the owner's
permission." The Montana Supreme
Court held that the policy definition
was "void as contrary to public
policy'' because it provides less cov-
erage than is statutorily required by
the Mandatory LiabiJiry Protection
statute, MCA S 61-6-301..
Note that the statute requires
vehicles operated in Montana "by the
owner or with the owner's permis-
sion" to carry minimum limits of
insurance. Consequendy, a Bodily
Injury coverage exclusion that ex-
cludes liabiJity coverage on the auto
if it is ddven by someone without
permission is valid and enforceable.
However, the same clause is void and
unenforceable if included in the
"other cars" provision, which covers




In 1987, in Iowa Mutual Ins.
Co. u. Dauis,l7 the court invalidated
and tefused to enforce a named
drivet exclusion. There, the insurer
had agreed to exclude from coverage
the insureds' sons, by name, in order
to make the covetage affordable. The
clause read as follows:
It is agreed that an insurance
and coverage under this policy
shall be null and void with
fespect to any claims arising
out of the operatiorì, use, or
occupancy of the automobile
descdbed in this policy, or out
of the operation, usê or occu-
pancy of any other automobile
to which the terms of this
policy otheru¡ise extends, by
the following named person(s):
Jeffery L. Davis (DOB 12-03-
59) & Alan Davis (DOB 8-25-
57) Sons of the lnsured.
Provided, however, this en-
dorsement shall not be effec-
tive if the automobile is
operated by the named insured
or the described automobile is
operated by any person other
thanJeffery of Alan and such
operation of the described
automobile is by and under the
express permission of the
named insured.
The court held that the exclusion
violated Montana's Mandatory Liabil-
ity Protection Äct, reasoning that the
Mandatory Liability statutes arc de-
sþed to ptovide continuous cover-
age to the general public, and the
named driver exclusion is "repugnant
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to this state's interest in protecting
innocent victims of automobile acci-
dents." However, the legislature im-
mediately amended the Mandatory
Protection Act to expressly authorize
the use of named driver exclusions
ancl accompanied the statute with a
statement of legislative intent that, as
^ 
m^ttet of public policy such exclu-
sions were desirable to allow premi-
ums to be affordable.l8
Liability Coverage.' The "em-
ployee" exclusion as applied to
thitd parties
The Montana Federal Court held
the "employee" exclusion to the auto
liability coverage to be ovetþ broad
and void if applied to thitd parties
instead of employers in Fr?e,Ins.
Exchange w Tibi, Kayset and
Allstate Ins. Co.le The exclusion
stated:
Allstate will not pay for dam-
ages an insured person is le-
gally obJigated to pay because
of: 4. Bodily injury to an em-
ployee of any insured person
arising in the course of em-
ployment.
The court reasoned that the
poJicy may properþ exclude colrerage
where an employee seeks to recoYer
from the employet (workers' compen-
sation exclusiviry) but not whete the




ln Swank w Chtyslet Ins.
Corp.r2o the insurer issued à gange
policy to an auto dealer that excluded
Jiability coverage for customers who
were permissive users of the dealer's
loaner cars. The policy extended
coverage to the customers driving
loanet cars to the extent the customer
did not have personal auto coverage
avaslalle that met the mandatory
minimum limit. (Ihe poJicy language
is not contained in the decision.) The
court held that insofat as the policy
excluded permissive use customers
who have their own coverage, it is
void because it does not provide the
statutory mandatory minimum cover-
age for "all vehicles owned or oper-
ated" in Montana. The coutt
reasoned that the poJicy sets a ceiling
of coverage, not the floot, as re-
quired by the mandatory minimum
coverage statutes tequire, The exclu-
sion was ruled void because it is
contrary to public policy.
Medical Pay Coverage: Subtoga-
tion Clause
In Allstate Ins. Co. v Reitle42l
the court held medical paymeflt sub-
rogation clauses ate invalid. The
standard subtogation clause reads as
follows:22
OUR RIGHT TO RECOVER
PÂ\.IVIENT
A. If we make a payment un-
der this policy and the person
to or for whom payment u/as
-,^s*uÏ"ff Ï::ï:ff:"r*gA- Experienced Legal Video Specialist & Documentary Produce, "â,S
1-8BB-gg5-8439
Five Valleys Video Productions
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made has a right to recover
damages from another we shall
be subrogated to that right.
That person shall do
1. \Vhatever is necessary to
enable us to exetcise our
rights; and
2. Nothing after loss to preju-
dicethem.***
B. If we make a payment un-
der this policy and the person
to or for whom payment is
made tecovers damages from
another, that person shall:
1. Hold in trust for us the pro-
ceeds of the recovery; and
2. Reimburse us to the extent
of our payment.
The court noted that the insured
paid a premium for medical pay cov-
erage and is mote likely to suffer if
med pay benefìts must be repaid
from third-party recovety. The in-
sured often has to comprornise the
claim to settle and suffers attorney
fees and costs v/hile the insurer
claims a rryht to be reimbursed
1,00o/o of the benefits paid. The
court noted the pubJic policy against
allowing assignment of personal
injury actions and held the subroga-
tion clause void as applied to Medi-
cal P ay coyerage. Yo u n gblo o d u.
Am. States Ins. Co.,23 followed
Reitlet in holding that subrogation
clauses for med pay are void as
against public policy.
Note that, tn 1.997 , the legislature
added the word "subrogation" into
533-23-203Q), so it read:
Á. motor vehicle liabiìity policy
may also provide for other
reasonable limitations, exclu-
sions, reductions of coverage,
or subrogation clauses that arc
desþed to prevent duplicate
payments for the same element
of loss...
Consequently, insurers then took
the position ReÌtfter was overruled by
the statutory amendment. However,
Swanson u llattford Ins. Co.,2a in
2001, made it clear that the "made
whole" rule srill applied to subroga-
tion so that a med pay insurer could
not subrogate untiL the insured was
made whole including attorney fees.
In essence, Swanson voided the
subtogation clause to the extent that
it allowed the insurer to subrogate
before the insuted has been made
whole including costs and attorney
fees. Then, the coutt n llardy
(2003), declated the statute unconsti-
tutional, so Rei¿Ie¡ again appears to
be good law Flence, subrogation as
applied to medical pay coverage is
invalid in Montana and, when applied
to other coverages, valid but subject
to the "made whole" rule.
Medical Pay Coverage: Choice of
Law Prouision
In Swanson (2001), a Colorado
policy contained a choice of law
provision mandating that any dispute
over subrogation be governed by
Colorado lav¿ Colorado law allowed
subrogation in derogation of the
"made-whole" rule whle Montana
deemed such subrogation to be
against public policy. Consequently,
the court held that application of the
Colorado choice-of-law provision
violated Montana public polìcy and
refused to enforce it. As a result,
argaaliy anytime an insurance
poticy's choice-of-law provision man-
dates application of another state's
law which would contravene public
interest in Montana, the choice-of-
law provision itself may be unen-
forceable.
Medical Pay Coverage: Antì-
stacking Clause
Ruckdaschel u State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.r25 held the anti-
stacking clause in Medical Pay cover-
age violates Montana's public policy.
The endorsement provided:
You, Your Spouse or Rela-
tives.., If two ore [sic] more
policies issued by us to 1ou,
loar spouse otJour relatiuu pro-
vide vehicle medical payments
coverage and apply to the
same bodiþ inju¿y sustained; a.
whlle orcapling a non-owned car, a
temþorarj sub¡titute car; oÍ b. as a
þedestrian the total limits of
liability under all such policies
shall not exceed that of the
policy with the highest limit of
liability."
Ruckdaschel followed Bennett
u State Fatm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co.,26 and reasoned that the same
public policy considetations that
invalidate anti-stacking clauses in
mandatory coverages "appIy to op-
tional types of insutance coverage
such as, in this case, medical payment
coverage." Those public policy con-
siderations were that "an insurer may
not place in an insurance policy a
provision that defeats coverage for
which the insurer has received valu-
able consideration," and that the
insured should be entitled to a rea-
sonable expectation of coverage up
to the aggregate limits of the policies
purchased.
The 1.997 amendment of MC,A.
S 33-23-203 to preclude all stacking
defeated Bennett, Ruckdaschel,
"Iloleman (I)"27 and "Iloheman(II)u" insofar as they allowed stack-
ing. Howevet, when llardy (2003)
declared the statute unconstitutional,
the holdings of those cases invalidat-
ing the clauses on public policy
grounds agasnbecame good lavr
Hence, under Ruckdaschel, an anrs-
stacking clause in Medical Pay cover-
age should be void as against public
policy in Montana.
However, one should note that
State Farm's "owned auto" exclusion
which effectively blocks stacking of
its Medical Pay covenge has been
held valid and enfotceable. It pro-
vides as follows:
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2. Policies Issued by Us to
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There is no coverage.
4. Fot medical .*p.nrå, fot
Bodiþ Injøry:
a. Sustained whìIe oøuþing or
through being struck by a ve-
hicle owned or leased by ya or
any relatiue which is not insured
under this coverage[.]
The court said that clause is not
ambþous and acts as a coverage
exclusion so that there is simply no
coverage, and no stacking question is
involved.
The court in Fatmets Alliance
Mut. Ins. Co. w Elohemanr2e also
held Farmers Alüance Mutual's Med
Pay anti-stacking provision to be
void. Theit provision read:
D. LIMTT OF INSURANCE
1. Regardless of the number
of covered 'autos,' 'insufeds,'
premiums paid, claims made
or vehicles involved in the
'accident,' the most we will pay
for dl. damages resulting from





The court followed Ruckdaschel,
above, and relied upon the pubìic
policy statements in Bennett. The
court held that, "where mulriple ve-
hicles are insured under one policy
and where a premium is charged for
coverage of each motor vehicle listed
within the poìicy" the insurer cannot
rely on the policy's exclusionaty lan-
guage to deny covetage.
Uninsured Motorist Covetage.'
Liability' Offset Claus e
Gdet u. Nationwide Mut. Ins,
Co.r3o held that a clause providing
liability coverage can be offset against
recovery of uninsured motorist ben-
efìts is invalid. In Griet, Nationwide's
policy included UM coverage which
by defìnition protected against injury
by both uninsuted motorists and
underinsured motorists:
We will pay compensatory
bodily iniury (meaning
bodily injury, sickness, dis-
ease, or deatþ damages that
ate due you by law from the
owner or driver of an unin-
sured motor vehicle . .,. ,\n
uninsured motor vehicle is:
2. one which is underinsured.
This is one for which there are
bodily injury liability coverage
or bonds in effect. Their total
amount, however, is less than
the limits of this coverage.
These limits are shown in your
poJicy's Declarations.
Then, undet "Lirnits of Pay-
ment," the policy stated, "the limits
of this coverage wül be reduced by
àny arnount paid by or for any Jiable
parties."
The court held that Grier was
actually recovering uninsured motor-
ist benefits under the policy's UM
coverage which was protected by the
UM statute, MCÁ. S 33-23-201. As
such, the offset of liability against the
UM coverage benefìt violated the
legislative intent of the statute of
protecting the public against injury by
uninsured (in this case undeiinsured)
motorists by offering a minimum
limit of UM coverage. The offset was,
therefore, void as against public poJicy.
Uninsured Motorist Coverage;
Wotk Comp Reducing Clause
The court jn Sullivan u. Doe,3l
held that a clause allowing workers'
compensation benefìts paid to be
deducted from UM benefits owed
under the auto poJicy was void. The
decision dóes not reflect the actual
language of the policy, so the authors
will quote the 19BB ISO language for
a sample work comp reducing clausel3z
B, ,A.ny amounts otherwise
payable fot damages under this
coverage shall be teduced by
all sums:* * * 2, Paid or pay-
able because of the "'lbodily
injury''under any of the fol-
lowing or similar law:
a. workers' compensation law;
or b. disability benefits law, * * x
The coutt determined that the
Montana UM statute mandated that
the insurer offer a minimum limit of
UM coverage to the insured and that
it did not provide for reducing that
limit by offsetting workers' compen-
sation benefits. Hence, the offset was
void as against pubJic policy.
Uninsured Motorist Coverage;
"Ì,{o Consent to Settlement"
Clause
State Fatm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
u 'Íay1or,33 held the "no consent to
settlement' clause in UM coverage
void. That clause provided:
THE,RE IS NO COVER.\GE:
1, FOR ANY INSURED
ìøHq nnTHouT ouR
NØRITTE,N CONSENT,
SETTLES \)ruTH ANY PER_
SON OR ORGANIZATION
IøHO MAY BE LIABLE
FOR THE BODILY INJURY
The court said, "This court does
not support provisions placed on
uninsured motorist coverage that
restrict or thwart available liability
coveÍage an insured would be entitled
to in an accident.* * * The insurance
company is obligated to furnish unin-
suted motor vehicle coverage, whether
it can obtain subrogation or not."
Uninsured Motorist Coverage;
Owned Auto Exclusion
tacob s on u. Imple me nt D e aúe rs
Mut. Ins, Co.r3a involved UM cover-
age with the following exclusion:
This policy does not apply
under Part IV (a) to bodily
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occupying an automobile
(other than an insured auto-
mobile) owned by the named
insuted or a telative, or
through being sttuck by such
an automobile.
The deceased was killed by an
uninsured motor vehicle while he was
driving a semi-ffactor and trailer
owned by the deceased and unin-
sured. Flowevet the deceased carried
UM coverage with Implement Deal-
ers Mutual on a pickup truck he
owned. The "owned auto" exclusion
blocked him from getting UM ben-
efits because he was not "occupying2'
the insured auto. The court held the
exclusion void because it violates the
intent of the UM statute, MCA S 33-
23-201,. The pubJic policy behind the
statute is protection of Montanan's
against injury by uninsured motorists,
and it makes no difference if the
victim is asleep in bed, jogging, or
driving in an uninsured, but owned,
vehicle when injured.
Uninsured Motorist Coverage:
Physical Contact Requitement fot
IIit-and-Run
McGlWn u Safeco Ins. Co.,35
involved UM coverage that provided
a hit-and-run vehicle was an unin-
sured motor vehicle for purposes of
benefìts ptovided it made physical
contact:
'uninsuted motor vehicle' in-
cludes a ftailü of any type and
means: þ) a hit-and-run auto-
mobile;. . .'hit-and-run auto-
mobile' means an automobile
which causes bodily injury to'
an insured arising out of
physical contact of such auto-
mobile with the insured or
with an automobile which the
insured is occupying at the
time of the accident. . .
The coutt held the physical con-
tact requirement was void as against
public policy, reasoning that there is
no statutory requirement of contact
in the uninsured motorist statute,36
and the purpose of "mandating" UM
coverage is to protect poJicyholders
from negligence of uninsured motor-
ists, not necessarjly contact. "It is
enough for a claimant to show his




Battell u Am. IIome.A,ssur-
ance Co.r37 held the "government
vehicle exclusion" to uninsured mo-
torist coverage void. That exclusion
provides:38
"Uninsured motor vehicle"
does not include any vehicle or
equipment... owned by any
governmental unit or agency.
The court reasoned that
Montanat UM statute does not ex-
clude any class of vehicles, and an
insurance policy excluding all govern-
ment vehicles resfticts the statutory
broad coverage and "is repugnant to
the clear public policy of Montana in
favor of uninsured motorist coverage
and against any limitarions upon
complete protection."
Underinsured Motorist Coverage..
Anti-s t ackin g Pt ovi sion
In 1993, in Bennett u. State
Fatm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,3e fhe
court dealt with an "other insurahce"
clause that effectiveþ prohibited
stacking. The clause provided:
If the insured sustains bodily
injury as a pedestrian and
othet underinsured motor ve-
hicle coverage applies: a. the
total limits of Jiability undet all
such coverages shall not ex-
ceed that of the coverage with
the highest limit of liability;
and b. we ate liable only for
our share. Our share is that
percent of the damages that
the limit of Liability of this
coverage bears to the total of
all underinsured motor vehicle
coverage applicable to the
accident.
The court held the "other insur-
ance" clause prohibiting stacking of
UIM is void as against public policy.
The court rejected as irrelevant argu-
ments that such public policy applied
only to UM coverage which is pro-
tected by statute. MC,A. S 33-23-201.
The coutt noted that its public
policy basis for stacking UM cover-
age \Ã/as "that an insurer may not
place in an insurance policy a provi-
sion that defeats coverage for which
the insurer has received valuable
consideration." The court stated that
"the purpose of underinsured mo-
torist coverage it to provide a source
of indemnification for accident vic-
tims when the tortfeasor does not
provide adequate indemnifìcation.'1
The court reasoned.that the public
policy that favors adequate compen-
sation for accident victims is sup-
ported by the same public policy
considerations that invalidated anti-
stacking provisions in UM coverage.
Finally the court based its decision
in the reasonable expectation doc-
trine:
Montana citizens should have
a reasonable expectation that
when they purchase separate
policies for underinsured mo-
torist coverage, they will re-
ceive adequate compensation
for losses caused by an
underinsured motorist, up to
the aggregate limits of the
policies they have purchased.
This case has been heavily cited
in later decisions for its extensive
statement of public policy bases for
voiding an insurance clause.
The court in Farmers Alliance
Mut. Ins. Co. u llolemanrao also
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held Farmers A-lliance Mutual's UIM
anti-stacking provision to be void.
Their provision tead:
D. LIMIT OF INSURANCE
1. Regardless of the number
of covered 'autos,' 'insufecls,'
premiums paid, claims made
ot vehicles involved in the
'accident,' the most we will pay
for aL damages resulting ftom
any one 'accident'is the
LIMIT OF INSURANCE for
IUNDERTNSURED] MO-
TORISTS COVERAGE
shown in the Declarations.
The court quoted the public
policy language of the Bennett case,
above, and noted that where sepârâte
premiums were paid for each vehicle,
stacking should be permitted even
though there were not separate poJi-
cies.
In Dakota Fite Ins. Co. u
Oie,al the court invalidated the anti-
stacking provision under the Unin-
sured Motorist coverâge of Dakota's
auto poJicy. The court noted that the
then-appJicable anti-stacking statute,
MCA S 33-23-203, forbade stacking
regardless of the number of vehicles,
but not the number of premiums
paid. Hence, citing Bennett (1.993),
the court determined that the statLlte
did not supplant the court's public
policy that where multþle premiums
are received for a personal and por-
table coverage, the insured is entitled
to a reasonable expectation that the
coverage can be stacked.
IIatdy w Progressive Speciahy
Ins. Co.,a2 which declared the anti-
stacking statute, MCl\ S 33-23-203,
unconstitutional, took up the issue of
whether Progtessiveb anti-stacking
provision in its poïcy was valid. The
provision read as follows:
LIMITS OF LIABILITY
* ,l< * If an insured person is
entitled to similar benefìts un-
der more than one (1) motor
vehicle insurance policy issued
by us ot an afîthate company,
the maximum recovery under
all policies shall not exceed the
amount payable under the
policy v¡ith the highest dollar
benefit limits, Similar benefìts
available under more than one
(1) motor vehicle insurance
policy issued by us or an afîth-
^te 
may not be added together
to determine the limits of cov-
erage avaiable under the poli-
cies for any orìe (1) accident.
The courr in llardy followed
Bennett and Chafee u U.S. Fid E
Guar. Co.rß in holding that the "pro-
vision belies the insurance
consumer's reasonable expectation
that he has purchased UIM coverage,
which by definition, is personal, por-
table, and, thetefore, stackable. For
this reason, we conclude the anti-
stacking provision in this case vio-
lates Montana pubJic policy."
Hardy was followed by Mitchell
u State Fatm Ins. Co.,a which
voided the following California anti-
stacking clause:
Limits of Liability Under




cause: (a) more than one ve-
hicle is insured under this
policY...t<*t<
If There Is Other Unin-
sured Motor Vehicle Cover-
agez 4. lf the insurcd sustains
bodìly Ìnjuty wh:il.e occupy-
ing a vehicle not ovmed b)¡
you, your spouse or any tela-
tive and: (a) such vehicle is not
described on the declarations
page of another policy provid-
ing uninsured motot vehicle
coverage; and þ) its driver is:
(1) you, your spouse or any
relative, or Q) any other per-
son not insured under another
such policy. then (a) the total
limits of liability under all ap-
plicable poJicies issued by us
shall not exceed that of the
one with the highest limit of
liability. . .
The court in Mitchell cited
Bennett, IIañy, and Chaffee for
the public policy stâtements in those
cases as they applied to stacking of
UIM coverage where the insurer had
received fìve separate premiums for
personal and portable coverage. The
court concluded, "fn shott, an anti-
stacking provision that permits an
insurer to receive valuable consider-
ation by charging premiums for cov-




In So¡ensen u Farmerc Ins,
Exchange,as Farmers's refused UIM
benefìts to its insured because it
found out she settled with the
tortfeasor and released the insurer's
subrogation rights without its con-
sent. In fact, the tortfeasor was judg-
ment proof. The subrogation clause
provided:
In the event of any payment
under this policy, we are en-
titled to all the rights of recov-
ery of the person to whom
payment was made against
another. That person must sign
and deliver to us any legal pa-
pers relating to that recovery,
do whatever else is necessary
to help us exercise those rights
and do nothing after loss to
prejudice our rights.
The court adopted a "no preju-
dice" rule holding that, unless the
insurer was actually prejudiced, it
could not deny the insured indemnity
benefits under the UIM coverage for
releasing its subrogation rights. The
court said: SØe favor this approach as
a matter of public policy. The pur-
pose of underinsured motorist insur-
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ance is to provide a source of indem-
nification for accident victims when
the tortfeasor does not provide ad-
equate indemnification.
In Fatmets Ins. Exchange u.
Chdstensona6 the court voided the
subrogation clause insofar as it might
allow an insurer to press "all of the
insured's right of recovery'' even if
that were more than the insuter paid
the insured. The clause provided:
Subrogation. In the event of
any payment under this poJicy,
the company shall be subro-
gated to all the insured's right
of recovery therefore, against
any person or orgatizaùon,
and the insured shall execute
and deliver instruments and
papers and do whatever else is
necessary. to secure such rights.
The insured shall do nothing
after loss to prejudice such
rights.
The court noted that this clause
makes it possible for the insurer to
collect mote from subrogation than
what it originaþ paid to the insured
and said that UM/UIM payments
may only be subrogated to the
amount the insurer actuàl7y paid out.
Underinsuted Motorist Coverage.'
Exhaustion Clause
Augustìne u. SimonsonaT held
that "exhaustion" clauses in UIM
policies are void. The clause in
Augustine provided:
\X/e wül pay under this cover-
age only after the limits of
Iiability under any applicable
bodily injury liability bonds
or poJicies have been ex-
hausted by payment of judg-
ments or settlements.
Hence, the insured could not
receive any benefìt of the UIM cover-
age, until he had settled with or re-
ceived a judgment against thè
tortfeasor's liabiìity insurance. The
court reasoned that requiring exhaus=
tion as a precondition of obtaining
UIM coverage is contra(y to public
policy and unenforceable. Exhaustion
clauses promote litigatìon expenses,
delay UIM payments, and fail to con-
sider the insured may have a valid
reason for accepting less than the
tortfeasor's policy limits. In August-
.ine, Justice Regnier set forth a proce-
dure for demanding and determining
UIM benefìts after demand was.made
on the tortfeasor's insurer for settle-
ment of the bodily injury claim but
before settlement of the claim against
the tortfeasor.
Underinsured Motorist Coverage:
(1) Nattow Definìtion of UIM and
(2) LÍabìlìty Offset
The court n llardy u Progres-
sive Specialty Ins. Co,,a8 declated
two important clauses invalid. First,
the poJicy used what the authors call
the "narrow" definition of UIM.
That is, it defines an underinsured
motorist by comparing that motorist's
Bodily Injury JiabiJity coverage with
the insured's limit of UIM coverage.
Consequently, rn any case where the
BI coverage available equals or ex-
ceeds the insured's UIM limit, the
insured wrll get no UIM benefit even
if his or her damages exceed the BI
coverage. The "broad" UIM defìni-
tion, on the other hand, defines an
underinsured motorist by comparing
that motorist's Bodily Injury JiabiJity
limit with the insured's tort damages.
This is a much more consumer
friendly defìnition. Progressive's nar-
row definition provided as follows:
ADDITIONAL DEFINI-
TIONS 2. "Underinsured
motot vehicle" means aland
motor vehicle or trail,er of any
type to which a bodily iniury
liabiìity bond or policy applies
at the time of the accident,
but the sum of all applicable
limits of JiabiJity for bodily
iniury is less than the covet-
age limit for Undetinsured
Motorist Coverage shown on
the Declarations Page. A,n
underinsuted motor vehicle
does not include any vehicle or
equipment. . . ft) that is an
uninsured motor vehicle.
The UIM coverage alse con-
tained an'roffset" provision allowing
the insurer to reduce UIM benefits
owed by any BI liability benefi.ts the
injured insured recovered from the
tortfeasor.
The Limits of Liability shown
on the Declarations Page for
Undetinsured Motorist Cover-
age shall be reduced tiy all
sums:'1. paid because of
bodily injury by or on behalf
of any persons or orgarúz.a-
tions who may be legally re-
sponsible, including, but not
limited to, all sums paid under
Part l-Tiability to Others.
' The declarations page showed
that the insured purchased $50,000
limits of UIM coverage for a sepatate
premium. Howevet, the court's analy-
sis was that there were almost no
situations where the insured would
ever recover $50,000 under the two
quoted clauses. For instance, in every
case where the tortfeasor caried
Montana mandatory minimum
($25,000) limits of insurance, the
$50,000Imit would be teduced by
$25,000. If the tortfeasor was unin-
sured, the UIM would not apply at
all. In every case where the tort-
feasor's liability coverage was equal to
or greater than the insuted's UIM
limit, no UIM benefits would be due.
Consequently, the court said, "we
conclude that the offset provision, as
well as the defìnition of underinsured
motorist, violate Montana prilti.
policy because they create an ambþ-
ity tegarding coverage, render cover-
age that Progressive promised to
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Iprovide illusoty, and defeat the
insured's reasonable expectations."
In reaching its holding, the court
in llardy took cognizance of the
previous decision of the Montana
Federal District Court in
'Ítansametica Ins. Gtoup u
Osbotn,ae There, Transamerica used
the narrow defìnition of UIM:
a land motor vehicle or trailer
of any q/pe to which a bodily
injury liability bond or policy
applies at the time of the acci-
dent but its limit for bodily
injury liability is less than the
limit of liability for this cover-
^ge.
As'tn llatdy, the federal court
compared the declarations page with
the UIM defìnition and concluded
that the two were inconsistent. The
court observed that there were few
circumstances in which the insured
would recoveï anything and none in
which the insured would recover the
$50,000 represented on the declara-
tions page. The court found the defì-
nition to be ambþous and to violate
. 
the reasonable expectations of the
insured so as to be against public
poJicy.
Mitchell u. State Farm Ins.
Co.,so followed lIatdy in holding a
similar narrow UIM definition and
UIM liabiìity offset void. It is note-
worthy that State Farm's policy, un-
like Progressive's in lIatdy
contained no separate UIM coverage,
the UIM defìnition being part of the
UM coverage, and that no sepafate
premium was paid fot the UIM cov-
erage. State Farm's policy defined
UIM as follows:
Undednsuted Motot Vehicle
- means a land motor vehicle,
the ownership, maintenance ot
use of which is: f . insured or
bonded for bodily injury Jiabil-
ity at the time of the accident,
but 2. the limits of the liability
are less than the limits of li-
ability of this coverage. . .
The "limits of liabiJity" section
reflected the offset of liabiJity cover-
age recovered agarnst the UIM:
6. If the damages are caused
by an undetinsurcd motor
vehicle, the most we pay
will be the lesser of: (a) the
difference between the lim-
its of liability of this cover-
age and the amount paid to
tk.c insured by or for any
person or organization who
is or may be held legaliy li-
able for t}l'e bodily iniury;
or (tt) the diffetence be-
tween the amount of the
insuted's damages for
bodþ iniury,andt}l'e
amount paid to tl":'e insurcd
by or fot any person or or-
ganizatton who is or may be
held legally liable for the
bodily injury.
In voiding State Farm's UIM
defìnition and the liability offset, the
court said the undednsured motorist
definition contravenes the insured's
expectation that coverage would exist
where the tortfeasor's limits of liabil-
ity are less than the stacked UIM
coverage of the insured. The offset
provision violates public policy be-
cause one premium is charged for
UM and UIM coverage and allowing
an offset defeats the purpose of the
"mandatory" UM coverage. The
insurer charged five ptemiums for
UIM coverage.
Arbitration Clauses
Note: John Morrison, Insurance
Commissioner for the State of Mon-
tana, prohibits arbitration clauses in
contracts of insutance. Consequently,
the Rates and Forms Bureau advises
the insurers that they may not include
them in the policy forms they submit
for use in Montana.
Conclusion
In addition to knowing which
provisions in auto insurance have
been declated void for violating the
code or for contravening public
poìicy, counsel must be able to ana-
lyze provisions to identifi' those
which may potentially be void and
unenforceable. Review of the above
cases reveals that an auto insurance
policy provision may be challenged as
void and unenforceable if the provi-
sion is:
f . in direct violation of the Montana
Insurance Code or other Montana
statutes;
2. ambiguous so as to be void and
unenforceable;
3, against pubtic policy for violating
the reasonable expectations of the
insured;
4. agatnst public policy for creating
"illusory'' covetage;
5. against public policy because it
takes away coverage for which the
insured has paid a premium; or
6. in some other way injurious to the
publìc ot against public good.
As these cases illustrate, the
courts are highly involved in the
regulation of insurance. Counsel
should be ever mindful that the courts
only heat a challenge to an auto insur-
ance provision if counsel recognizes
the provision's violation of public
poJicy and challenges it in court. o
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